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www.FSRL.co.nz/blog – new blog location Anna Sandiford Feb 11

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This blog has moved to http://www.fsrl.co.nz/blog/ because it’s now integrated into our company webpage.

Cocaine on money, drug traces on banknotes Anna Sandiford Feb 10

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I was surprised at a news article in the English MailOnline, which states that Every British bank note is contaminated by cocaine within weeks of entering circulation. I wasn’t surprised about the cocaine issue, but about the fact that the media seemed to think this was new or unusual. I’ve been working on cases involving drug traces on banknotes since 2002 and even back then 95% of English banknotes were contaminated with traces of cocaine. To my mind, the most comprehensive database dealing with drug traces on banknotes is compiled and maintained by a company in the West Country of England. When I left England in 2008, practically 100% of banknotes in the database were contaminated with cocaine (and not just contaminated but high levels of contamination), less were contaminated with MDMA (from Ecstasy) and amphetamine, and less still with diamorphine (from heroin) and THC (from cannabis).  The company is question is not one of the mainstream prosecution laboratories but a standalone organisation that has developed specific equipment to deal with analysing traces of drugs on all sorts of items including vehicles, clothing, mobile phones and, of course, banknotes. It should be remembered however that the traces of drugs we’re talking about here are so minute that they can’t be seen with the naked eye.  To put it into perspective, if one took a grain of salt and divided it into 1,000 pieces and then if one took one of those pieces and divided again into 1,000 pieces, this is the level of contamination that the anaytical equipment can detect – it’s teeny, teeny tiny.  The other way to look at is if the total amount of drugs present on one million English banknotes (each contaminated with this small weight) was bulked together it would amount in size to no more than a single grain of salt. Drug traces on banknotes can be extremely valuable for assisting Police and Customs to determine whether or not seized quantities of money have been involved with the drug trade but cocaine has always been a difficult one to interpret.  Wouldn’t it be great if the technology could be applied in New Zealand, given that there is such a problem with P here?

Cool science Anna Sandiford Feb 02

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Some of us Scibloggers were called ‘cool’ this week by the Taranaki Daily News – Cool science. It is cool indeed to be called a cool scientist.

Crime DNA databases should be independently examined Anna Sandiford Jan 07

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Who has ever analysed the data in national DNA databases?  Courtesy of programs like CSI and the news/media, we all know that DNA can be an extremely powerful tool in crime solution.  When a sample from a crime scene is compared with a sample from an individual it should be the easiest thing to be able to say whether or not they originated from one and the same person, shouldn’t it?

In forensic science (and many other areas of science), without a solid and reliable database, interpretation of results can be troublesome or even meaningless.  So who has checked all the databases that have been built up by Police and prosecution agencies over the years?  Who checks them to make sure that the data is correctly entered or that the statistical basis for the interpretation is still correct and appropriate?  As it turns out, it doesn’t appear that anyone is really doing it, particularly in relation to the USA.  An article in this week’s New Scientist demonstrates this: Unreliable evidence? Time to open up DNA databases. Most of the world’s DNA results (and I am talking about those relating to criminal casework) are interpreted using the results of relatively small studies undertaken during the early years of DNA forensic casework.

The opening two paragraphs of the article cover it quite nicely, I think: “When a defendant’s DNA appears to match DNA found at a crime scene, the probability that this is an unfortunate coincidence can be central to whether the suspect is found guilty. The assumptions used to calculate the likelihood of such a fluke – the “random match probability” – are now being questioned by a group of 41 scientists and lawyers based in the US and the UK. These assumptions have never been independently verified on a large sample of DNA profiles, says the group. What’s more, whether some RMPs are truly as vanishingly small as assumed has been called into question by recent insights into DNA databases in the US and Australia. I find that slightly unnerving because I know from professional experience that if a DNA result is presented in court, it’s unbelievably difficult to shake anyone’s faith in the result.

I’m not suggesting that there is anything significantly wrong with any of the DNA databases but they should be open to examination by independent scientists so that the reliance that is placed on DNA interpretations can be shown to be well-placed. It makes the results relevant and reliable, which is important for acceptance as evidence in court.

The article does a good job of explaining the problems associated with DNA databases, describing three possible reasons why some profiles on the reference databases match one another (if they are all from different people then they should all be different): 1. duplication of the same profile in the database; 2. assumptions about frequency of occurrence of allelles in populations (see article for definition); and 3. the large number of relatives that may be on a given database (people who are closely related share more common areas of DNA in their profiles than people who are unrelated, which is logical). Particularly in relation to the latter point, if only a partial profile is obtained from a crime scene (i.e. only part of the DNA profile ‘picture’ can be detected), the chances increase of the sample matching more than one person’s database profile. (N.B.  There are essentially two sets of information in DNA databases – DNA profiles obtained from crime scene samples (so initially we don’t know who is the source of them) and DNA profiles taken from actual known people, usually suspects (depending on the legal jurisdiction)).

Of course, the converse of this is that if a DNA profile in the database has been incorrectly entered in some way, the chances of getting a “hit” on a cold case are also affected (a “hit on a cold case” is where re-examination of evidence is undertaken some time after a crime was committed, usually years afterwards, and a newly-acquired crime scene DNA result is run through the database for the first time.  If the crime scene profile matches a person’s profile already on the database, you’ve got a “hit”).  If the data’s not correct in the database, a ‘hit’ might become a ‘miss’.

The big question is whether the FBI will allow a group of independent scientists to review the USA’s CODIS database – and the answer at the moment is no.  This to me is a fairly typical attitude of prosecution agencies for this kind of access.  I can understand their reluctance in a way but I would think it would be a better thing to have it reviewed now rather than wait for a case to demonstrate a monumental stuff-up and get beaten with the consequences later, particularly to have it reviewed by people who would sign confidentiality agreements and then look at the data as a whole rather than focussing on one case where there may well be a problem.  As the closing commentary says, “Without external scrutiny of the databases, doubts will remain….All of this can be resolved by letting scientists have access to the data to do what they need to do.“  We all have our dreams, and I hope theirs comes true.

[The New Scientist article is based on a Science article, December 2009, v.236, p.5960]

Indiana: forced DNA samples Anna Sandiford Oct 20

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I read with interest an article Indiana court: no warrant needed to force DNA where the Americans are up in arms about being able to take a DNA sample from someone after they’ve been arrested.  Just as well they haven’t been to England recently then.  In England & Wales, if a person is arrested in relation to any crime the Police can and do take DNA samples and fingerprints.  These are processed and put on the national database, regardless of whether the person is ever found guilty of a crime.  It makes the DNA database an extremely effective tool in the fight against crime.  Many people have been arrested as the result of being arrested for something relatively minor such as recidivist speeding or outstanding Council fines and their DNA has come back with a “hit” on the database for something far more serious such as rape or murder.

I understand from police colleagues that in New Zealand there is no automatic right to be able to collect samples from people when they have been arrested but those arrested people can be offered the option to provide samples.  Police officers I know like to encourage people to give their DNA but if the person isn’t convicted of a crime then the sample and the results must be eliminated.

Personally, I don’t have a problem with contribution to a DNA database.  In fact, I had to provide a sample on more than one occasion in order to be able to even enter some of the forensic science laboratories in England & Wales – and I know those samples weren’t destroyed after I had left the lab.  Perhaps I don’t mind because I know how the database works and I still have faith that it works properly.  What happens when the day comes that it doesn’t work properly and a miscarriage of justice occurs?  It’s happened with the fingerprint database – to a police officer.

I know that many people have a problem with the idea of part of their body being taken by the State and kept for comparison with other samples at a later date.  Everyone’s entitled to their own opinion but at the end of the day, the Police need to be able to tackle crime in the most effective way possible.  Not getting arrested is the best way for a member of the general public to keep their DNA and fingerprints off the database, so therefore I assume the answer is not to become a Person Of Interest to the Police.

Forensic science applied to art Anna Sandiford Oct 16

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It’s amazing the jobs that people have and the uses to which scientific techniques can be put.  Take forensic art investigation for example.  As a forensic pollen specialist, of all people I should know the value of cross-discipline application of forensic techniques, but I hadn’t ever really heard of forensic art.  Yet here is forensic art in action, re-assigning a piece of art to da Vinci – altering the value of the painting from NZ$42,000 to a staggering NZ$350 million: How do Experts Authenticate Art? They’ve used a combination of techniques to produce a convincing result: radiocarbon dating places the age at a time consistent with da Vinci, brush stroke analysis demonstrates probable left-handedness.  A faint fingerprint was found on the canvas, which matched one found on a canvas known to be a da Vinci that is hanging in Vatican City.

However, I can’t help but wonder whether this evidence meets the standard of proof required in criminal or civil cases.  How do we know that the fingerprint on the known da Vinci actually belonged to da Vinci?  A good lawyer would trash that in seconds: maybe da Vinci had an assistant who also handled his pictures.  What is the error on the radiocarbon date?  What is the risk of radiocarbon contamination?  Was da Vinci definitely left-handed?  What is the likelihood that the painter was left-handed?  Perhaps I am just a cynic who should allow art to be appreciated…