SciBlogs

Archive 2009

Wade in the water Gareth Renowden Dec 31

Join the conversation at Hot Topic

Estimates of the sea level rise that will result from continued global warming continue to increase, with two recent papers adding more evidence that the IPCC AR4 projections were unrealistically low. The rise this century could be as high as 1.9 metres, and the long term response to a warming limited to 2ºC could be 6 – 9 metres the studies suggest. There are also signs that New Zealand planners are beginning to take the issue seriously, with Nelson and Wellington both considering the impacts of sea level rises of over a metre.

The new sea level rise (SLR) estimates for this century are explained in Global sea level linked to global temperature by Martin Vermeer and Stefan Rahmstorf (PNAS December 22, 2009 vol. 106 no. 51 21527-21532, PDF here). The paper’s an update and refinement of Rahmstorf’s 2007 study that used a semi-empirical statistical model to calculate a relationship between global temperature and sea level rise (PDF). From the discussion:

If our method presents a reasonable approximation of the future sea-level response to global warming, then for a given emission scenario sea level will rise approximately three times as much by 2100 as the projections (excluding rapid ice flow dynamics) of the IPCC AR4 have suggested. Even for the lowest emission scenario (B1), sea-level rise is then likely to be ~1 m; for the highest, it may even come closer to 2 m.

This graph from the paper shows the increased projections:

Rahmstorf09SLRproj.png

Vermeer and Rahmstorf are considering the transient response of sea level to warming, but the longer term increase — when the climate system has come back into balance, the oceans have warmed up and all the ice that’s going to melt has melted — is certain to be much higher. In Probabilistic assessment of sea level during the last interglacial stage by Robert E. Kopp et al (Nature 462, 863-867 (17 December 2009) — PDF available here), the focus is on sea levels during the last interglacial period, the Eemian, 125,000 years ago. In the Princeton press release, Kopp explains the reasoning, and finishes with one of the nicest bits of understatement I’ve come across this year:

“The last interglacial stage provides a historical analog for futures with a fairly moderate amount of warming; the high sea levels during the stage suggest that significant chunks of major ice sheets could disappear over a period of centuries in such futures,” Kopp said. “Yet if the global economy continues to depend heavily on fossil fuels, we’re on track to have significantly more warming by the end of century than occurred during the last interglacial. I find this somewhat worrisome.”

Worrisome? A fair point.

Kopp and his team compiled a database of high quality sea level records for the Eemian. Polar temperatures at the time were around 3-5ªC higher than present — roughly what we expect to see if the global average rises by 2ºC — but they find that sea levels are likely to have been around 8 metres higher than present (range 6 – 9 metres). Previous estimates, based on a smaller set of records, were 4 – 6 metres. Kopp et al’s method suggests that long term (1,000 year) SLR increases could have been as high as 9.6mm/yr, but their method can’t rule out periods of faster rise on shorter timescales (as was suggested in this recent paper on the Eemian). The obvious lesson, as Kopp et al note, is that SLR greater than 6 metres above present “is likely to have required major melting of both the Greenland and the West Antarctic ice sheets, an inference supported by our finding that both Northern and Southern hemisphere ice volumes are very likely to have shrunk by at least 2.5 m equivalent sea level relative to today.”

Back in New Zealand, the citizens of Nelson and Wellington have both been considering the impacts of substantial sea level rise. In Nelson, a report (PDF) commissioned by Solar City NZ from the Cawthron Institute highlighted the city’s vulnerability to SLR of 1 – 2 metres. At one metre, the areas in red on the graphic at the top of the post (click for a larger version) would be liable to inundation — and that reaches deep into the city centre. At 1.9 metres (a number supplied by Tim Naish at VUW, perhaps after reading a preprint of Vermeer & Rahmstorf) all the yellow areas would be in trouble. Wellington City Council, meanwhile, has been considering its climate change action plan, and was shown a graphic (shown in the Dom Post story) highlighting the central city’s vulnerability to a rise of one metre. Current advice to local government is to allow for 80cm of SLR by the end of the century and 10mm per year thereafter, but that looks to be in urgent need of revision — upwards.

[Eva Cassidy and icebergs]

The Wizard turns on… Gareth Renowden Dec 30

Join the conversation at Hot Topic

Catching up with some of the stuff that got lost in the Copenhagen hubbub, this morning I stumbled on a major new effort to provide interactive climate data and visualisations — the Climate Wizard. This amazing tool is the web front end to a collection of temperature and precipitation data and model projections, and allows the user to create custom maps of climate change over the last fifty years, and projections for the 2050s and 2080s for three IPCC scenarios across 16 models. It provides state-level detail for the USA, but coarser regional and global maps for the rest of the world. It can also create ensembles of model projections on the fly:

[Lead author] Girvetz recommends using one of the newest features added to the program, the ability to create an ensemble of some or all of the 16 models. Want to average the temperatures of, say, the 12 climate models that forecast the largest temperature increases? Climate Wizard can do so almost instantaneously. [Source]

The background to the Wizard (a joint effort of the University of Washington, University of Southern Mississippi and The Nature Conservancy) is described in this PLoS One paper.

Apart from being a very interesting way of looking into temperature data and projections, it is also a tool set that can be extended by the addition of extra data: the authors suggest they could include “simulations of global vegetation, fire, water runoff, species range shifts, agriculture, sea level rise, heat stroke, disease, and food security.” They also suggest that the Climate Wizard could provide a basis for web “mash-ups” with services like Google Earth/Maps to help with public education on climate change. Highly recommended.

[Flaming Lips]

A positive view of Copenhagen Bryan Walker Dec 29

Join the conversation at Hot Topic

coplogoI wrote a column early in December trying to discern reasons for hope even in the face of the likelihood that Copenhagen was not going to produce a legally binding agreement. In the event it not only did not produce a legal agreement, but endorsed an Accord quite different from the kind of document we were expecting.  I’ve asked myself since whether the measure of cautious hope I  expressed in advance was foolishly optimistic.  Certainly some commentators have suggested so. But not all. Joseph Romm’s Climate Progress website has been upbeat about the Accord.  And today he has drawn attention to an article in the Huffington Post by David Doniger, policy director of the US Natural Resources Defence Council’s climate centre.  Doniger hails the Accord as a gridlock breakthrough on three counts:

First, it provides for real cuts in heat-trapping carbon pollution by all of the world’s big emitters.  Second, it establishes a transparent framework for evaluating countries’ performance against their commitments.  And third, it will start an unprecedented flow of resources to help poor and vulnerable nations cope with climate impacts, protect their forests, and adopt clean energy technologies. 

Doniger writes warmly of Obama’s personal involvement in forging the agreement and rescuing the conference from collapse. Brazil’s President Lula commented that it was unlike the kind of discussions that Heads of State normally have, and reminded him of his days as a trade union negotiator. I have read some accounts of the events which suggest that Obama showed little concern for climate change and was revealed as just another political leader manoeuvering to preserve the perceived interests of his own country ahead of those of the global community. It would be deeply disappointing if that were the case. Earlier this year I read both of Obama’s books, Dreams From My Father and The Audacity of Hope, as well as the collection of his election policies and speeches in Change We Can Believe In, and felt they represented an authentic and decent commitment to human welfare. I have written positively on Hot Topic several times about his unequivocal statements on climate change and the measures his administration has already begun to take to address it. “The science is beyond dispute and the facts are clear. Now is the time to confront this challenge once and for all.” I certainly don’t want to hastily credit the possibility that this has all been shown up as nothing more than hot air.

Back to Doniger, who addresses some of the concerns he has seen expressed about the Accord. First is the argument that the Accord isn’t enough to keep us under 2 degrees. He concedes that the agreement is not in itself ambitious enough to achieve that, but points out that Obama was quite candid that it is only a first step. Doniger thinks a significant one:

The real goal going into Copenhagen was to get the U.S., China, and the other fast-growing developing countries to take their first steps to curb their emissions.  That goal was achieved.  And that was no mean feat.

A second expressed concern is that emission cuts aren’t specified. In reply Doniger points to the open enrollment period through to the end of January which allows countries to record their emission reduction commitments. He considers that a year ago the targets and policy announcements on offer today from big developing countries would have been unthinkable. The Accord creates a dynamic situation, with the potential for a virtuous circle of countries reinforcing their commitments over time in response to similar moves by others.

In reply to the objection that the commitments aren’t legally binding, Doniger replies that the Accord sidestepped “legally binding” in favour of action commitments from both the big developing countries and the U.S.  Otherwise there was unlikely to have been an agreement. And there are other ways of getting there:

If countries can be bound by a web of interests and economic forces to make and follow through on commitments, that will mean more than any legalistic formulation of their duties. 

In response to the objection that the Accord threatens the future of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, Doniger points to the limitations of the Conference of the Parties in requiring consensus of all 193 countries – a requirement which finally resulted in the Conference agreeing to “take note” of the Accord rather than adopt it, because of the continuing opposition of Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Sudan. 

Doniger expects the government of the new Accord is likely to depend in part on the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate. Gareth noted in his Copenhagen post that the mix of this organisation covers just about all the necessary bases.  This doesn’t mean the UNFCCC will necessarily have no function, as Doniger sees it, but it will need to find ways of working which do not leave it open to rogue obstructionists and it will need to embrace the new agreement wholeheartedly.

Finally Doniger addresses the claim that the Accord won’t move the Senate.  It will:

[It] delivers the two principal things that swing Senators have demanded from the international process:  meaningful commitments to reducing the emissions of key developing countries, and a transparent framework for evaluating their performance against those commitments.    

Political disappointments are not hard to find in the issue of climate change. I’m willing to hope that the kind of analysis of the Accord that Doniger and others offer proves to have some substance.

I wish it could be Christmas every day Gareth Renowden Dec 25

Join the conversation at Hot Topic

It doesn’t seem to matter how long I live down here (and it will be 14 years, in a matter of weeks), I still think the man in the moon’s upside down, and Christmas carols don’t sound right when it’s 27ºC and you’ve just barbecued sausages for a Christmas Eve supper. Nevertheless, Hot Topic will be making determined efforts to be jolly, and if the surgical reconstruction of the turkey I’ve just boned goes to plan, then I’ll be far too stuffed to blog for a day or two. Bryan may have other ideas, but HT is likely to be on skeleton service for a week or so. I’ve got a couple of posts in mind, but Mum’s mince pies (the best in the world, of course) must come first. Compliments of the season to one and all, ignore the ghost of Christmas future for a few weeks, and here’s a little something to warm your heart…

This video was embedded using the YouTuber plugin by Roy Tanck. Adobe Flash Player is required to view the video.

Storms of My Grandchildren Bryan Walker Dec 24

Join the conversation at Hot Topic

Storms of My Grandchildren: The Truth About the Coming Climate Catastrophe and Our Last Chance to Save HumanityPhotos of James Hansen’s grandchildren have appeared not infrequently in  his presentations in recent years.  He obviously delights in them.  But he also fears for them.  The nature of that fear is spelt out in his newly published book Storms of my Grandchildren with its foreboding subtitle The Truth About the Coming Climate Catastrophe and Our Last Chance to Save Humanity. 

Last chance?  As critical as that?  In his lucid concluding summary statement Hansen points to climate system inertia as the reason. Currently inertia is protecting us from the full effects of the changes and can seem like a friend. But, as amplifying feedbacks begin to drive the climate towards tipping points, that same inertia will make it harder to reverse direction. The ocean, ice sheets and frozen methane on continental shelves all resist rapid change, but only for so long.  And they are being subjected to human-made forcings far more rapid than any of the natural forcings of the past. 

Science is at the core of the book, but Hansen has woven it into a narrative of his encounters with policy makers over the past eight years. In 2001 he was invited to explain current scientific thinking to the cabinet-level Climate Task Force. He focused on changes in climate forcings, in watts per square metre, between 1750 and 2000, using a graph which estimated the effects of a variety changes dominated by human activity. The information seems clear enough as Hansen shares it with us, but it obviously became muddied in the Task Force proceedings, especially when.contrarian Richard Lindzen was  invited to the second meeting and focused on uncertainties as well as questioning the motives of “alarmist” scientists. Hansen’s belief that the new administration was serious about wanting to understand climate change looks a little naïve in retrospect. Incidentally Hansen himself is always aware of uncertainties in his science and careful to accord them proper status. 

A further invitation to a different White House group in 2003 saw him centre his presentation this time on paleoclimate and the evidence from the past  that large climate changes can occur in response to even small forcings. This topic is explored at some length, with occasional exhortations to readers to hang on if it seems to be getting too complicated.  Feedback figures prominently here, as does climate sensitivity to doubled carbon dioxide.  The non-carbon dioxide forcings such as methane and black soot attracted some interest at the meeting, but the administration by now seemed to share Richard Lindzen’s perspective and to distrust the scientific community.  He records no further invitations to White House meetings.

2003 saw the publication of a paper by Hansen which questioned the IPCC and conventional approach to sea level rise.  He explains in the book the evidence from paleoclimate studies of rapid sea level rise and discusses the part played by the huge reservoir of energy provided by the ocean and by ice sheet dynamics.  If ice sheets begin to disintegrate we can expect no new stable sea level on any foreseeable timescale. Ocean and ice sheets each have response times of at least centuries. 

In 2005 Hansen endured the events described by Mark Bowen’s book Censoring Science: Inside the Political Attack on Dr. James Hansen and the Truth of Global Warming, reviewed here. Some of this ground is traversed again here, and then Hansen offers readers the bad news that the dangerous threshold of greenhouse gases is actually lower than the 450 ppm he had accepted for some years, and goes on to explain how this change of mind occurred.

The name of Bill McKibben enters the scene at this point, for it was in response to his request for an appropriate parts per million figure for his website that Hansen settled with colleagues to re-examine the question.  The result was the famous 2008 paper Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity Aim? and McKibben’s 350.org movement.  The two climate impacts that Hansen believes should be at the top of the list that defines what is “dangerous” are sea level rise and species extinction.  He explains how reduction of CO2 levels to 350 ppm would restore the planet’s energy balance. 

Hansen is widely honoured and respected in the scientific community. He has also taken some pains to make his scientific work accessible to the general reader, as his website reveals. He is happy to accept writer Robert Pool’s description of him as a witness, meaning  “someone who believes he has information so important that he cannot keep silent.” 

Criticised for his incursions into the field of policy in more recent years, Hansen is unapologetic about it when he comes to draw conclusions from the research on the appropriate target level of atmospheric carbon dioxide. “Coal emissions must be phased out as rapidly as possible or global climate disasters will be a dead certainty.” Should scientists deliver that conclusion and then leave it to the politicians to deal with it?  Not in his experience. They will fudge the issue if they can. In particular he is scathing in his rejection of cap-and-trade schemes, which he considers will continue to allow fossil fuels to be burned.  He favours instead a rising price on carbon applied at the source, with the fee returned to the population in equal shares. This insistence on the carbon tax method rather than emissions trading may well lack finesse, as his critics allege, but the suspicion of vested interests and of the influence of lobbyists which underlies it is surely justified.

He admits that the phasing out of coal emissions by 2030 is a huge challenge.  Energy efficiency measures and renewable energy development will probably not in his view be sufficient to replace coal by then, and he eloquently pleads the case for 3rd and 4th generation nuclear plants. 

A scary chapter looks at what he calls the Venus syndrome.  Back in 1981 when he wrote his first comprehensive paper on the impact of increasing atmospheric carbon dioxide he presumed that, as the reality of climate change became apparent, government policies would begin to be adapted in a rational way.  He didn’t count on two challenges to that presumption. The first is the remarkable success of special interests in preventing the public at large from understanding the situation. The second is politicians’ almost universal preference for greenwash and fake environmentalism. All right, he says, what will happen if we go on burning and push the planet beyond its tipping point?     After a careful discussion of consequences he concludes that if we burn all the reserves of oil, gas, and coal there is a substantial chance we will initiate the runaway greenhouse. If we also burn the tar sands and tar shale it’s a dead certainty.  Between times lie the storms which will be upon us during the lives of his grandchildren.

Small wonder the scientist has become a climate activist and places such hope as he can muster in the mobilisation of young people to demand appropriate actions from their governments. Activists are not gloom and doom merchants, and it’s clear that he hopes the general public will yet become aware of the real threat discerned by the science and demand the action so far avoided by politicians. All honour to him for the witness he bears.

After Copenhagen: new world disorder Gareth Renowden Dec 23

Join the conversation at Hot Topic

coplogoIt’s a bit like reading the runes — trawling through reactions to the events of the last couple of weeks, trying to work out what the Copenhagen Accord means. I don’t mean a parsing of the words, though translating the language of diplomacy is never trivial, but what the various parties to the Accord, and the rest of the world, think it means — and crucially, what that implies for future action to reduce emissions.

For background, read this excellent BBC analysis of Copenhagen, and Joe Romm’s interesting take at Climate Progress (which refers to Bill McKibben’s reactions at Grist, plus there’s a more considered McKibben article at e360), but the article that really helped to crystallise my thoughts is Mark Lynas’ insider’s account of the final phases of negotiations:

To those who would blame Obama and rich countries in general, know this: it was China’s representative who insisted that industrialised country targets, previously agreed as an 80% cut by 2050, be taken out of the deal. “Why can’t we even mention our own targets?” demanded a furious Angela Merkel. Australia’s prime minister, Kevin Rudd, was annoyed enough to bang his microphone. Brazil’s representative too pointed out the illogicality of China’s position. Why should rich countries not announce even this unilateral cut? The Chinese delegate said no, and I watched, aghast, as Merkel threw up her hands in despair and conceded the point. Now we know why – because China bet, correctly, that Obama would get the blame for the Copenhagen accord’s lack of ambition.

Lynas’ key point is that China holds the real power in any negotiation. As the new superpower on the block, it is beginning to flex its geopolitical muscle. As the world’s biggest emitter, it knows that no solution is possible without it. The US administration knows if that if China is not part of an emissions deal, the chances of passing domestic legislation to cut emissions are small. Everybody needs China, and China knows it.

At the same time, the UNFCC process relies on building consensus. Every country has a say, every country can delay, demur, or derail proceedings. If national interests don’t align, only the weakest of deals can be done. Copenhagen Accords, in other words. That leads to the essence of Joe Romm’s argument: if the big emitters act together outside the UN process, the problem is well on the way to being solved.

Obama launched the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate back in March (a follow-on from a Bush initiative designed, ironically, to delay action), and it includes all the key players: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States. That mix covers just about all the necessary bases: the rich developed nations, the rapidly growing developing countries, and Brazil and Indonesia, where deforestation is a huge issue. China’s position would not necessarily alter simply because of the change of venue, but the process of deal-making might be easier.

One small feature is missing: the rest of the world, the 170 or so countries not invited to the table. That includes Burkina Faso, Tuvalu — and New Zealand. The poorest nations, and particularly those most likely to feel the impacts of climate change, will have to rely on what amounts to goodwill. $100bn a year in 2020 is on the table, but would that still be the case if the MEF were to a deal in their own interests? For New Zealand, which has always relied on and advocated a multilateral approach to global issues, any influence we currently have would vanish. Lke the rest of the world, we would have to like it or lump it.

That’s why much official reaction to Copenhagen has centred on the need to follow it up with binding commitments to emissions reductions, to sign a better deal in Mexico at the end of 2010. Unsurprisingly, the UN wants the UNFCC process to continue — and I would guess that the vast majority of the UN’s membership agrees. But realpolitik is king, big economies wield the power, and a political structure that evolved to manage a balance of power during the cold war years of the 50s and 60s is beginning to look irrelevant when confronted with this global tragedy of the commons.

Here’s the big question. We have an urgent need to cut emissions, to stabilise and then reduce the atmospheric greenhouse gas load. The numbers are clear enough, the danger is pressing. Events in Copenhagen suggest that we lack the global political apparatus to deliver those emissions reductions in the timescale required, so should we look around for something else that can do the job? Ends or means? The balance between the two is what will emerge over the next year.

Two things will influence the direction the world takes: the perception at international level of the seriousness of the climate problem, and the position adopted by China. My feeling is that until there are severe and undeniable impacts, the collective will for action — especially in the absence of strong leadership — will remain weak. Unless and until the Chinese show signs of taking strong action within some sort of international framework, significant emissions reductions look like pie in the sky. And we’re looking like char siu.

Methane rise confirmed Gareth Renowden Dec 22

Join the conversation at Hot Topic

The recent global uptick in atmospheric methane levels is confirmed today by new figures from NIWA’s Baring Head station, near Wellington. Southern hemisphere methane rose by 0.7% over the two years 2007-2008. The video above, narrated by tropospheric chemist Katja Riedel gives an inside view of what goes on in and above the Baring Head lighthouse — well worth a view. The increase comes after a three year period when levels had appeared to stabilise, as NIWA’s graph shows:

BHmethaneAug2009.gif

From NIWA’s press release:

This [...] accounts for more than half of the growth observed over the ten years 1999–2008 (1.2%). Methane is the second most important contributor to global warming behind carbon dioxide, though its abundance in the atmosphere is far lower. Additional methane traps twenty one times more heat over 100 years than the same mass of carbon dioxide (CO2 ).

“The evidence we have shows that methane in the atmosphere is now more than double what it ever was during the 800,000 years before 1700AD” says NIWA Principal Scientist, Dr Keith Lassey. This is based on analyses of ancient air trapped in polar ice that has been extracted and dated.

The new figures confirm the global picture compiled by NOAA in the US. The increase is thought to be related to a return to wetter conditions in the tropics after a relatively dry period from 1999–2006 and warming in the Arctic. There’s a lot more background information on NIWA’s news page.

Copenhagen: no FAB deal Gareth Renowden Dec 21

Join the conversation at Hot Topic

Barry Coates’ last blog from the Danish capital looks at what was actually achieved and where we go from here, and includes his final analysis of the conference. The full set of Barry’s updates are posted at Oxfam’s web site and also at Pacific Scoop.

Day 13 – Saturday 19th December

Looking back, looking forward

This is the way the summit ends. Not with a bang, but with a whimper. 119 world leaders came, they saw and they certainly didn’t conquer. They were captured by their limited vision, their vested interests and the lack of trust between them that has it roots in long standing divisions, including a denial of historical responsibility on the part of the major developed countries.

There was some serious damage done to reputations. The United Nations processes were deeply flawed, countries like New Zealand have been exposed as self-interested blockers and President Obama doesn’t walk on water. Some leaders came out with credit. The vulnerable countries, particularly the Pacific, negotiated hard and fought for 1.5°C to be included in the Copenhagen Accord – they succeeded but their efforts to have a clear aim for a legally binding treaty through this process was stripped out late last night. President Lula from Brazil assumed the mantle of world statesman with a powerful speech and an offer to help other developing countries. Thousands of civil society activists were able to build public support and attention across the world.

But to little avail. The final agreement was empty of content and extremely weak on the level of ambition. We came into the Summit calling for a Fair, Ambitious and Binding deal. We lost the Fair early on when Annex 1 countries could not agree to a financing package beyond the next three years. It was closely followed by the Ambition – leaders could not even commit to a global goal of keeping global temperature rise below 2°C. Then in the wee hours of this morning, the Binding was stripped out in a very untransparent way.

Next steps are for emissions reduction offers to be tabled by 31st January 2010. As explained below, that is a dangerous development, given the lack of political will to decent offers from Annex 1 countries. Then there will be a two week negotiating session in Bonn Germany from 31 May to 11 June 2010, followed by the next annual UN Climate Change Conference (CoP 16) towards the end of 2010 in Mexico City. None of that gives us much confidence that they will be able to muster the political will or bridge the political divides that are needed to provide the political mandates that are essential for a FAB deal.

Because their job is not done, nor is ours. We need to build a far more powerful campaign for the future. We must ensure that the politicians who caused this problem are held to account for this missed opportunity.

I am in a hotel with Oxfam colleagues from around the world, all having worked so hard but feeling pretty empty after this empty outcome. We are off to a bar to cheer ourselves up and to ask some of the tough questions about where to from here. And I will do so with partners in the Global Campaign for Climate Action (the TckTckTck campaign). Anything is on the table for re-thinking. Except wavering in our determination to secure this FAB deal. Anything else is unthinkable to ourselves, our kids, our planet and for billions of vulnerable people.

Since waking up this morning, I have been working with colleagues to prepare the following analysis. I hope you find it useful. But now I’m signing off from this blog and will take a few days off, to recover my health and my sleep. Happy Xmas to you all and thanks for reading these posts.

What the Copenhagen Decisions mean

December 19, 2009: There is extreme urgency. The scale of the crisis means that emissions need to peak within five years. People are already suffering unnecessarily from a lack of protection and support. We have just lost a year. The hope of millions of people has been frustrated and potentially a base of political support has been lost.

Status of Decisions:

AWG-LCA: Document UNFCCC/CP/2009/L6

The document setting out the conclusions of the work of the AWG-LCA was agreed. Tuvalu and Barbados sought to ensure the process would lead to a binding protocol.

CoP Decision:

“CoP takes note of the Copenhagen Accord 18 Dec 2009.” It is not agreed, only noted. Because there was not consensus on the Accord, it was agreed the Parties supporting it would be listed.

The Reasons for the Impasse

There were two interrelated issues that were to blame for the turmoil during the summit, although it should be recognised that the roots of this failure extend back at least to the initiation of the Bali Action Plan.

1. The Process

There were a small number of countries that came to this Summit without the intention of negotiating in good faith. They were generally countries that have massive vested interests in fossil fuels, or that exclusively focus on their short-term competitiveness. These countries often undermined the negotiations dynamic.

Many countries were left out of the ‘friends of the Chair” process and withheld their agreement. While there was an attempt to include negotiating groups, the selection of participants was not open and transparent. The problem was also that the Danish Presidency grossly mismanaged the process. It was most unfortunate that Heads of State found themselves effectively negotiating from the podium, rehearsing their national positions rather than proposing breakthroughs which had not been achieved in the preparatory meetings.

The usual brinkmanship was relied on to deliver an agreement after hours of late night working. This forced an agreement under conditions of tiredness, stress and bilateral influence (which opens up the potential for bullying and favours, reinforcing the positions of the larger and more powerful countries).

The breakdown of this process may signal that the days of stitching up deals in small selective groups and then expecting all countries to sign up are over. There must be questions over the style used for consensus building and decision making.

Climate change negotiations are starting to look eerily like trade negotiations, including the dominance of commercial self-interest in the position. We need processes which move us away from competitive negotiations, where countries try to minimise their concessions, to collaborative actions informed by the science, for example, conducting problem-solving sessions in mixed groups rather than blocks. It is clear that the UNFCCC negotiating process would need substantial reform to handle the complexity of this issue.

While the security challenges of such a meeting are huge, it is inexcusable that the forward planning did not take account of needing civil society and other observers to be present for transparency and legitimacy.

2. The Substance

The Annex 1 countries didn’t come to Copenhagen with sufficient offers and then didn’t improve them. Even the offer on long term finance was full of caveats and loopholes. The rich countries did not make offers that were based, even loosely, on sound science. We were told there would be final offers made during the last hours. These were never tabled.

Some developing countries came with proposals and concessions (eg. China on MRV, Brazil on financial contribution for developing countries and MRV, South Africa offer on emissions reductions). An analysis of Annex 1 offers compared to major developing countries offers on a consistent basis of below BAU (Business as Usual) is likely to show that at least some major developing countries are more ambitious than average Annex 1 levels (particularly when omissions and loopholes offered to Annex 1 countries such as on surplus AAUs, LULUCF accounting rules and bunker fuels are taken into account).

The loss of full agreement, that would have included international MRV for China, means that we potentially lose an important step that could help unlock the negotiations. Also at risk from the lack of full agreement is the agreement to the starter funding for adaptation and the goal on long term finance (even if not a commitment).

On the other side, the lack of full agreement means some of the unhelpful parts of the Accord are not locked in, such as a systematic lowering of ambition and a lack of clear commitment even to 2°C. The process for agreeing mid-term targets, without a criteria for burden sharing and a top down process to test the adequacy of targets, is of serious concern. Continuing the current pledge and review approach undermines equitable burden sharing and a level of ambition based on science. Current emissions reductions pledges by Annex 1 countries are outweighed by the loopholes. On current pledges, we are headed for a 3.9°C temperature rise.

On the positive side, there is at least a consolidation into a Chair’s text for AWG-KP and AWG-LCA which has helped unblock the large accumulation of previous texts that Parties refused to take off the table.

The Politics:

The agreement with China is a step forward in terms of gaining political capital for the Obama Administration’s position in the US; however, a full agreement to the Copenhagen Accord would have been more helpful. Unfortunately, the adversarial atmosphere in Copenhagen might be used to provide opponents of climate change and multilateralism with ammunition. More broadly, the lack of clear success might mean that some Heads of State would be wary of coming to the next Summit on climate change.

We face major challenges in calling for Parties to get back to negotiations given the likelihood that there will be a widespread perception that this would fail again. The lack of trust is even deeper than it was before Copenhagen (it should be observed this is not unique to the UNFCCC process – the Doha trade negotiations process isn’t much better). Moving forward, we will be challenged to say what has changed in the underlying political conditions where 116 Heads of State have failed.

Copenhagen closes: too little, too late Gareth Renowden Dec 20

Join the conversation at Hot Topic

coplogoThe Copenhagen climate conference finally wrapped up in the wee small hours of Sunday morning NZ time (3:26pm Saturday in Denmark), with delegates agreeing to “take note of” a “Copenhagen Accord” [PDF here]. The agreement sets no legally binding targets, establishes no follow-on framework for Kyoto, only “recognises” the need to stay under 2ºC, and that parties “should cooperate in achieving the peaking of global and national emissions as soon as possible”. On the plus side, the accord does provide for assistance to developing countries of US$30 billion over 2010-12, and commits to a “goal” of US$100 billion a year by 2020. The meeting ended after an all night plenary session in which a group of developing countries including Bolivia, Cuba, Sudan and Venezuela blocked progress because of the lack of binding targets for the developed world.

Although late drafts of an agreement included references to 80% cuts by 2050 for developed countries, this disappeared from the final text. All the Accord requires is that developed countries “commit to implement individually or jointly the quantified economy- wide emissions targets for 2020″, with these targets to be appended to the agreement by the end of January 2010. Developing countries can do the same, for their preferred emissions targets. This will all be reviewed by 2015, and in a nod to the small island nations, the review will consider strengthening the goal to a 1.5ºC limit.

The final deal was stitched together by the US and China, in a meeting with India, Brazil and South Africa, and effectively imposed on the rest of the world. Here’s how BBC environment correspondent Richard Black describes it:

Ministers and scientists and campaigners who dedicated huge swathes of the last year to making a tough deal happen watched aghast as Chinese and US leaders and their entourages flew in, took over the agenda and emerged with what was basically their own private deal, with leaders announcing it live on television before others realised it had happened.

As you’d expect, leaders from EU countries and the developing world that really don’t like this deal have been assuming rictus grins and telling us it’s a “good first step”.

New Zealand’s climate change ambassador Adrian Macey was equally unimpressed, describing the process as “appalling” in the Herald this morning. Sudan’s environment minister said the weak deal would commit Africa to a holocaust, and Ian Fry, spokesman for Tuvalu said it would spell the end of his country. More reaction at the BBC report & analysis, Telegraph, Guardian (editorial), New York Times, and Stuff.

My take? Copenhagen was always going to end with a deal of some sort, because too many leaders had too much mana invested in the process for there to be an overt collapse. However, the deal that’s been done — essentially a private affair between the US and China, imposed on the rest of the world and accepted only because something is better than nothing — delivers little in the way of concrete progress. Unless the momentum that built up before COP15 began can be maintained through the next year, and targets agreed and implemented in some sort of credible fashion, then the prospects for emissions peaking early enough to give the world a chance of staying under 2ºC will be essentially zero.

What are we left with? I suspect this process will bumble on for years, with many fine words and minimal action. One report suggested that China’s real position was that it would prioritise economic growth until climate impacts grew too severe, then go for rapid adaptation. If that’s true, then we’re all toast. Nothing really transformative will be attempted until the effects of warming are so severe that the world will be plunged into a wartime response to the issue. That’s when the climate commitment — the 30 years of warming in the pipeline — will really bite. I fear that the only interesting questions now are how soon, and how bad will it be?

Behind the scenes in Copenhagen: historic COP out Gareth Renowden Dec 19

Join the conversation at Hot Topic

Oxfam NZ’s executive director Barry Coates provides perspective on the final day of negotiations in Copenhagen. With the dust still to settle, his analysis is about as thorough as you’re likely to find. The full set of Barry’s updates are posted at Oxfam’s web site and also at Pacific Scoop.

Day 12 – Friday 18th December

Historic opportunity, historic moment, historic CoP out

This saga is unfolding as I write. A few hours ago we thought the deal was done and put out an (almost) final press release. Then the apparent agreement between President Obama, Wen Jiabao, the EU, India, South Africa and a few other big countries started to unravel.

First the EU said they were unhappy about it (which may just have been spin doctoring to cover their embarrassment over a massively weak deal), then Sudan (chair of G77 – the group of developing countries) said they had not been consulted and would not accept the deal, and then AOSIS – the group of small island states – said they would be submitting a new draft agreement. As it has been for most of the past two weeks, the process is in chaos.

The day started as it has ended, with confusion about what was actually happening behind the scenes. The heads of state had met late into the night and we were leaked the draft statement at 2.30am. It was no surprise that leaders had not come with ambitious proposals but the obvious depth of disagreement was a surprise. The result was a very weak proposal that did not even fully agree the goal to maintain global temperature rise at below 2°C.

The much vaunted announcement of US$100 billion for long term funding turns out to be a goal to mobilise funds, not a commitment; to come from carbon markets, not just public financing; potentially a mix of new funds and diversion of existing aid; and without any specifics on the sources of funding. Oxfam has been calling for predictable funding that is raised directly (such as through a levy on airline and maritime fuels), rather than through national Treasuries (which could add to government budgets).

So this deal that is spun in the media as “an agreement to move forward’ is probably not an agreement, not much movement and it is doubtful that it is even forward.

I seem to have been doing this analysis of drafts for a very long time. There have been six versions and lots of discussions on each one. It is the last night of negotiations and I still haven’t made it to bed before 1am.

I was in the hotel for almost the whole day today, writing and analysing. But I have had a few breaks. One for meeting up with an old friend from Vietnam who works for the UN and one for an interview with TVNZ. The media have been very interested in the messaging from here – it has been great to be able to tell the real story from Copenhagen rather than the version according to the NZ government.

This won’t be the last blog. I am going to bail out tonight and catch up with the final statements in the morning. It’s a final wrap up day tomorrow, but with these negotiations you never know! This may appear to be a pretty disappointing outcome but it should really motivate us to re-double our efforts to get the Ministers back into the process.

Here are the details of what happened and where to from here:

Oxfam analysis of the Copenhagen climate change convention

The empty political statement issued from Copenhagen shows a historic lack of leadership. The key political decisions were not taken at the start of these negotiations and they have still not been taken. This job has not been done.

As a result, the blame game has started. Oxfam considers that the primary cause of failure lies with the rich nations – they have failed to come with proposals that would fulfil their responsibilities, while trying to shift the burden onto developing countries. It is welcome that the US, as one of the biggest polluters, has rejoined the multilateral system. But their proposals must strengthen, not undermine, the commitments from rich countries, which fall far short of averting climate catastrophe.

Poor countries negotiated strongly for a deal that is consistent with the science, and which aimed to protect vulnerable people and planet. The shame of Copenhagen was that rich countries have negotiated primarily on behalf of vested interests and industrial lobbies.

At best, we are now confronted with deadly delay that means unnecessary tragedy for millions of families. The impacts will be felt in every country, and will fall particularly hard on poor people in developing countries.

Just as alarming is that there is no clear and credible way forward to conclude a legally binding agreement soon. Leaders ducked the political decisions that have been lacking since the launch of negotiations two years ago in Bali. There is still no agreement to the fundamentals. This is unacceptable.

Analysis of the outcomes

The negotiations started with ten days of meetings between officials and then the high level segment of three days involving Ministers and Heads of State. The talks got off to a bad start with the leak of a secret draft of an outcome statement that the Danish government, as President of the Conference, was preparing. A selected group of countries was consulted in the drafting process, and the draft was seen to be biased towards the interests of the rich nations. When the Danish Prime Minister subsequently tried to introduce a draft text as a basis for negotiations, developing countries angrily rejected it.

Negotiations continued in the two tracks that were agreed in Bali two years ago – a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol (KP) and a new Long Term Agreement (LCA). In Copenhagen, negotiators reduced the size of the document, but did little to agree the hundreds of unresolved issues.

There was also clumsy management of the talks over the attempt to combine the two negotiating tracks, strongly resisted by developing countries who saw it as part of an effort by rich nations to evade their commitments to emissions reductions under the Kyoto Protocol. The talks teetered on the brink of collapse several times, wasting valuable negotiating time.

Then the Climate Change Ministers and 115 Heads of State arrived. The particular role for the high level segment was to come to agreement on the big political decisions that have been blocking negotiations. They failed to do so, primarily because rich countries, having promised to play their trump cards at the eleventh hour, turned up almost empty handed.

Global goal: Leaders could not even agree on a goal to keep global temperature increase well below 2°C – they only referred to the goal and undertook to enhance their action. So far, Annex 1 emissions cuts tabled in negotiations add up to only 13-19% below 1990 by 2020. When adjustments are made for the effect of loopholes on AAU surpluses (hot air), LULUCF accounting and bunker fuels, Annex 1 emissions would actually rise. This puts is on track for global temperature rise of well above 2°C and catastrophic climate change – modelling suggests by as much as 3.9°C.

Finance: The announcement of $100 billion for adaptation and mitigation by 2020 is an important step forward – finally specific amounts of funding are being discussed. But there is no clarity on how much will be public finance – reliable and predictable funds that will allow poor countries to plan and invest in adaptation and low carbon development. It seems that rich countries are keen to inflate the total with private finance through market mechanisms. Furthermore, there is no clear commitment that this money would not come from existing aid commitments, effectively diverting future spending away from essential services in poor countries. Finally there is no clarity on the individual commitments rich countries will make. This potentially continues a long line of empty promises by world leaders.

Legally Binding: The commitment to complete the deal is a hollow promise without a clear plan for what a legally binding treaty or treaties will look like, whether all rich nations will be legally bound to reduce their emissions, and how we will get there – and no new commitment period established under Kyoto.

Next steps:

Business-as-usual negotiations are failing to solve the climate crisis. Options on the table are too vague for decision-making, and do not reflect evolving climate science. Technical negotiators are debating issues that need ministerial mandate but too little time is given for ministers’ talks to make progress leading to last-minute late-night decisions. Governments are still focused on securing national interest instead of securing our shared destiny.

The international process must now gear up to a new level of talks. Sustained, intense and focussed engagement must run throughout the year – at the political, scientific, technical and public levels. The key to unlock these issues is political agreement on fundamental milestones. To move forward, negotiators must first agree a global goal, a scientifically credible range for mid-term emissions reductions, and a framework for funding.

1. Heads of State: demonstrate climate leadership – The last two years of competitive negotiations must now be turned into collaborative engagement for a deal in 2010, starting with a new mandate driven by Heads of State.

2. Ministers: prepare for Sleeping-Bag Ministerials – A set of intense quarterly meetings for both tracks of negotiations must drive to political agreement. Each ministerial should end only when its mandated milestone is reached: for example, to halve the number of brackets in the text, and halve the size of the numeric ranges set out in the remaining brackets.

3. Climate scientists: put facts back at the heart of negotiations – Climate science is evolving rapidly and alarmingly, but negotiations continue on the basis of outdated projections. Updated estimates on emissions trajectories from the IPCC are urgently needed, including a scenario for limiting global temperature rise to 1.5ºC.

4. Negotiators: provide analytical support for decisions – Vague definitions and unclear options in the text are holding up negotiations. Technical experts must clarify definitions and rules (such as on LULUCF accounting) to close loopholes, and detail options on burden sharing criteria and innovative finance mechanisms. LDCs should have access to technical support from a standing team in the UNFCCC. Civil society could contribute to the integrity of the negotiations by providing them with a formal role in submitting proposals.

5. Public support: build the case and widen the base – Over the past two years there has been a massive increase in public understanding of climate change and commitment to action. From the boardrooms of progressive businesses to communities across the developing world there is now a global demand for leaders to conclude a fair, ambitious and legally binding deal. Copenhagen may have been a cop out but Oxfam will continue to work with our partners and allies across the world in an attempt to avert climate catastrophe.

« Older Entries